The epic moment when 10,000 trapped Spartan warriors fought for 1,500 miles to survive

At the death of King Darius II in 404 BC, his elder son Artaxerxes II succeeded to the throne of Persia.

His younger brother was Cyrus the Younger, who held command of the empire’s western provinces, including Lydia, Phrygia, and Cappadocia, and refused to submit to the new king’s rule.

From his base in Sardis, he began preparations for rebellion, and he believed that his control of Sardis, direct access to local troops, and existing alliances gave him a real chance of success. 

To expand his forces, Cyrus needed a reliable and well-trained army, so he turned to the Greeks.

Their hoplites had gained a reputation for military skill after decades of internal wars and campaigns abroad.

Cyrus claimed that he required mercenaries for a campaign against rebellious highland tribes in Pisidia, which he used as a cover to avoid suspicion.

This lie concealed his actual objective: to seize the throne of the Persian Empire by force. 

Many of the Greeks who joined came from the Peloponnesian League, and among them was Cheirisophus, a Spartan officer whose presence suggests that Cyrus had secured support from the Spartan ephors.

Some scholars believe that Sparta saw the rebellion as an opportunity to weaken Persian power or gain leverage in Anatolia.

Other soldiers came from Athens, Arcadia, Boeotia, and Thessaly, and they formed a coalition that included both professional soldiers and adventurers drawn by promises of high pay.

Key commanders such as Proxenus of Boeotia, Menon of Thessaly, and Sophaenetus of Stymphalus helped lead this mixed force. 

At first, few questioned the long eastward march. The route led from Lydia to Phrygia, then on to Cilicia and Syria.

As the journey lengthened, suspicion grew and, eventually, word spread that the army was heading toward Babylon itself rather than Pisidia.

By then, the Greeks had marched too far into unfamiliar lands to withdraw safely or demand release from their contracts. 

By September 401 BC, the army of Cyrus had reached the plains near Cunaxa, a site north of Babylon along the Euphrates River.

There, they encountered the main forces of Artaxerxes II. The rebel army included over 10,000 hoplites and about 2,500 light troops, but the king’s army far outnumbered it.

Some estimates placed the Persian royal forces at over 100,000 men. Importantly, Artaxerxes brought his top cavalry and the Immortals, his best infantry unit. 

At the opening of the battle, the Greek phalanx on Cyrus’s right flank advanced in tight formation and quickly routed the Persian troops directly in front of them.

Their heavy armour and close ranks allowed them to maintain unity, and their training generally proved better in direct combat.

However, the Greeks pushed too far to the right, which separated them from Cyrus, who commanded the centre of his army. 

Soon after, Cyrus spotted Artaxerxes and charged toward him with his personal guard.

According to Xenophon and Plutarch, he cried out, "I see the man!" and may have even wounded the king.

Unfortunately, moments later, the royal guards killed Cyrus with a javelin to the eye and, that single loss, largely destroyed the rebel cause.

Without Cyrus, the campaign effectively ended. His death scattered the Persian portion of his forces and left the Greeks trapped. 

At that moment, the mercenaries still held the battlefield and had suffered few losses.

However, they no longer had any political or military purpose. They had marched hundreds of kilometres from their homelands, won their part of the battle, and yet found themselves leaderless, unsupported, and surrounded by enemies with no clear route of escape. 

Shortly after the defeat, the Greeks opened talks with the Persian satrap Tissaphernes, who claimed to offer safe passage for the Greeks if they followed his column northward.

The offer seemed reasonable because the Greeks needed food and other supplies, local guides to show the roads, and escorting troops to protect them through hostile territory.

Tissaphernes insisted that the king wanted peace and that the Greeks would not be harmed if they cooperated.

Eventually, the Greek leaders had ultimately accepted the terms and had agreed to accompany him.

After several days, he invited them to a feast near the Zab River under the excuse of hospitality, which led to the Persians arresting the generals.

Soon after, several of the prisoners were executed on the orders of Artaxerxes.

Among those killed were Clearchus, Proxenus, Menon, and others, though Cheirisophus was not among them and died later during the retreat, likely from illness.

Ariaeus was a Persian interpreter who had previously served Cyrus and may have helped orchestrate the betrayal. 

Back at the camp, the remaining troops received news of the betrayal, which created chaos.

With no guides, no translators, and no allies, many believed they would be massacred or forced into slavery, so fear understandably froze the army.

Some men considered surrender, while others wept openly. 

Then, a solution came from an unexpected figure. Xenophon was an Athenian gentleman-soldier who had joined the army as a guest of Proxenus.

Now, he stepped forward, and during a night meeting, he urged the men to reject despair, elect new officers, and plan their escape.

His speech inspired action, so at dawn they chose new commanders, and Xenophon became one of them. 

From that point onward, the Greeks began their retreat through hostile lands.

Their goal was the Black Sea, as they believed that once they reached Trapezus, a Greek colony, they could find ships and return home.

However, the road north crossed mountains, rivers, and territories held by hostile tribes, which meant that the soldiers would face cold, hunger, and near-constant ambushes. 

Each day, they fought small battles against local enemies. Among the fiercest were the Carduchians, who used mountain terrain to launch ambushes from above.

Greek scouts initially struggled in such terrain, which demanded rapid adaptation to unfamiliar hit-and-run tactics, and the narrow paths made defence difficult.

Even so, they built defensive positions and used their phalanx in modified form to repel attacks.

Xenophon reorganised the army into divisions of lochoi to better navigate rough terrain and maintain discipline. 

At times, they advanced only a few kilometres a day. Snowstorms, frostbite, and lack of food killed many, as some froze overnight, and others collapsed from exhaustion.

The soldiers took what they could from hostile villages and shared rations when supplies ran low.

Whenever possible, they traded with neutral communities to avoid unnecessary battles. 

Eventually, they entered Armenian territory. There, they encountered fresh Persian forces led by Tiribazus, who shadowed the army and sought to delay its movement.

The Greeks launched surprise night raids on his camps, which forced the Persians to withdraw, and as they pushed westward they subsequently reached the upper Euphrates and moved into the Pontic highlands.

By now, their numbers had reduced, but discipline remained. 

At last, they climbed into the mountains above Trapezus, from whose summit they saw the Black Sea.

Xenophon wrote that the men shouted “Thalatta! Thalatta!” (The sea, the sea!). The cry spread through the ranks.

They had marched about 1,500 miles and reached a Greek city, so their survival was now more likely. 

Years later, Xenophon published his account of the expedition under the title Anabasis, which he wrote in the third person and which narrated the events with careful recording of facts, practical day-by-day detail, and some thoughtful commentary.

He described the terrain, the tactics, and the hardships, but also captured the emotional weight of the retreat and the human choices behind military action. 

As time passed, Anabasis gradually became an important text for students of strategy and leadership, which commanders across the Greek and Roman worlds came to study.

Alexander the Great had read it before crossing into Asia. In addition, Julius Caesar had liked its clear style and had used it as a model for his own Commentaries.

Roman generals praised it for lessons on surviving hardship, strict unit discipline, and how commanders led under pressure. 

For Sparta, the outcome had mixed results, at least in the short term. Although Cheirisophus had fought bravely, Sparta had provided no support during the crisis and had failed to defend its officer after his capture.

Athens, too, initially showed limited interest in Xenophon’s return, and he later settled in Scillus under Spartan protection after he had been exiled by his home city.

He went on to write other influential works such as Cyropaedia and Memorabilia. 

Still, the story endured largely because it showed the dangers of depending on distant rulers and the risks of mercenary life in foreign wars.

Yet it also showed what disciplined men could sometimes achieve when abandoned.

The Ten Thousand did not break; they fought their way home. 

Through the pages of Xenophon’s Anabasis, the march became a story of men surviving harsh conditions, of clear practical reporting, and of leadership carried out under disaster.

The voice of one man, preserved across centuries, carried the memory of an army that refused to surrender.