How the Kornilov Affair fractured the fragile Russian Revolution

In early 1917, Russia faced overwhelming social, economic, and military crises. The First World War, which had begun in 1914, placed immense strain on the nation.

Millions of Russian soldiers had died in brutal battles, while food shortages and inflation swept through the cities.

So, on February 23, 1917, in Petrograd, thousands of workers took to the streets in protest.

Their initial demands for bread quickly grew into a widespread rebellion against the Tsar.

Within days, the unrest swelled, and soldiers, once loyal to the regime, joined the demonstrators.

By March 2, Tsar Nicholas II was forced to abdicate the throne, which brought to an end over three centuries of Romanov rule. 

With the monarchy gone, Russia’s political future became uncertain. The Provisional Government, now led by liberals and moderate socialists, attempted to fill the power vacuum.

It promised democratic reforms but chose to continue the war effort: a deeply unpopular decision.

The new government was headed by Prince Georgy Lvov and later Alexander Kerensky, but they lacked the authority and resources to address the needs of the people.

Kerensky’s vision for Russia was one of gradual reform, but he was frequently caught between competing political forces.

His refusal to withdraw from the war only intensified the divisions. As a result, radical factions like the Bolsheviks seized this moment to denounce the Provisional Government, calling for "peace, land, and bread".

Tensions between these groups and the government escalated as the months passed. 

Subsequently, the Provisional Government faced fierce opposition from all sides.

The Soviets, councils of workers' and soldiers' deputies, who wielded significant influence in the cities, questioned who truly held power.

Meanwhile, the war continued to devastate the country, and the morale of the soldiers plummeted.

In July 1917, violent demonstrations, known as the July Days, erupted in Petrograd.

Though the government was able to quell the unrest, it became clear that its hold on power was increasingly fragile.

This became even more evident as revolutionary forces grew bolder, and distrust of the Provisional Government intensified. 

Lavr Kornilov was born in 1870 in what is now Kazakhstan and was the son of a notable Cossack soldier.

As a result, he grew up in a military environment and even attended the Mikhailovsky Artillery School as well as the prestigious General Staff Academy.

He rose through the ranks of the Russian Imperial Army and, by the time of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-1905, Kornilov had earned a reputation for bravery.

However, his outspoken nature sometimes put him at odds with his superiors.

During World War I, he commanded forces on the Eastern Front. Following his capture by Austro-Hungarian forces at Przemyśl in March 1915, he managed to escape from the prison camp in the autumn of 1916: an event that boosted his reputation in military circles.

By 1917, Kornilov had become a nationally renowned figure, known for his hardline views and disdain for the growing influence of socialist factions within the military.

He believed that only a strong, centralized authority could prevent Russia from descending into chaos.

After the February Revolution, Kornilov was appointed commander-in-chief of the Russian army in July 1917 by Prime Minister Alexander Kerensky.

Unfortunately, Kornilov clashed with Kerensky almost immediately, as his conservative views and desire to restore discipline in the military were at odds with the more moderate, reformist stance of the Provisional Government.

In particular, Kornilov sought to bring back the death penalty for desertion and believed that the Soviets, with their calls for soldiers’ councils, were undermining the war effort. 

Ultimately, Kornilov saw himself as a defender of Russia against the threat of Bolshevism and what he perceived as the collapse of national unity.

He became increasingly frustrated with the Provisional Government’s inability to assert control.

By late August 1917, Kornilov was convinced that Kerensky lacked the resolve to restore order, and he began discussions with right-wing elements who shared his vision of a strong military-led government.

While Kerensky viewed Kornilov as a valuable ally in maintaining stability, Kornilov’s ambitions grew, and he saw himself as the last hope for saving Russia from internal collapse and foreign defeat. 

Initially, Kerensky, as head of the Provisional Government, appeared to support Kornilov's demands for restoring military discipline and imposing martial law, which Kornilov interpreted as an endorsement of his plans for a stronger government.

This led Kornilov to expect the transformation of the Provisional Government into a military dictatorship with himself at the helm.

Additionally, Vladimir Nikolaevich Lvov, who falsely presented himself as an emissary of Kerensky, communicated Kornilov's intentions to Kerensky, which further complicated the situation.

Kerensky's initial agreement to some of Kornilov's demands may have contributed to Kornilov's belief that he had Kerensky's backing. 

Kornilov was then able to convince some troops to follow him by appealing to their desire for order and stability in Russia.

He portrayed his actions as necessary to save the country from chaos and defeat in World War I.

Kornilov argued that the Provisional Government, under pressure from the Bolsheviks, was undermining the army and the nation, thus presenting himself as a savior of Russia. 

In fact, Kornilov had significant support among the military hierarchy, including top generals and officers, who were frustrated with the ongoing disorder and inefficiency within the army.

Many of these military leaders, as well as non-socialist elements of society, saw Kornilov's plans as a means to restore discipline and authority.

His call for a military dictatorship resonated with those who believed that strong leadership was necessary to counteract revolutionary forces and stabilize the country. 

In late August 1917, Kornilov prepared to act against the Provisional Government.

On August 25, Kornilov ordered his troops to march on Petrograd, the capital, with the aim of seizing control.

His plan was to crush the Bolsheviks, dismantle the Soviets, and impose strict military discipline on the country.

When Prime Minister Alexander Kerensky learned of Kornilov’s movements, he initially hesitated, unsure whether the general intended to support the government or overthrow it.

However, as reports confirmed Kornilov's intent to seize power, Kerensky took action.

On August 27, he dismissed Kornilov from his position as commander-in-chief and declared him a traitor.

Kerensky then appealed to the Soviets and workers for help in defending Petrograd.  

In response, workers and soldiers mobilized, digging trenches and organizing militias to resist Kornilov’s advancing troops.

The once-divided leftist factions, including the Bolsheviks, rallied to the defense of the Provisional Government.

When Kerensky called on the Soviets to defend Petrograd, the Bolsheviks took the lead in organizing resistance to Kornilov’s march.

Their Red Guards, made up of armed workers, became the visible force protecting the city.

This gave the Bolsheviks significant credibility, as they were seen as the only group capable of effectively defending the revolution. 

Kornilov’s march quickly faltered. The railway workers, sympathetic to the Soviets, disrupted the movement of his troops, and many soldiers, realizing they were being used in a coup attempt, abandoned the effort.

Kornilov himself was arrested on September 1, 1917, without a significant fight.

His attempted coup had failed, and Kerensky, for the moment, remained in power. 

The Kornilov Affair severely weakened the Provisional Government, as it exposed its inability to maintain control over the military and the country.

Also, Alexander Kerensky’s desperate appeal to the Soviets for help undermined his authority, showing that the government could not stand on its own.

Many saw Kerensky’s actions as a betrayal of the military, especially after he dismissed Kornilov and had him arrested.

This caused a rift between the government and conservative factions, who had previously seen Kerensky as their best hope for restoring order.

The Provisional Government, already fragile, now appeared even more incapable of handling the escalating crises in Russia. 

The affair also played a significant role in boosting the Bolsheviks. By positioning themselves as defenders of Petrograd against Kornilov’s forces, the Bolsheviks gained credibility among the workers, soldiers, and peasants.

They had been warning for months that the Provisional Government was leading the country toward disaster, and the Kornilov Affair seemed to confirm their suspicions.

Under Lenin’s direction, the Bolsheviks capitalized on this moment by increasing their influence in the Soviets and gaining more recruits to their cause. 

The Kornilov Affair also deepened the division between the moderate socialists, like Kerensky, and the more radical elements of the revolution.

Meanwhile, the government’s reliance on them further eroded its legitimacy.

Many people, disillusioned with both the war and the government’s inability to deliver reforms, began to turn toward more radical solutions, seeing the Bolsheviks as the only party capable of bringing real change.

In the months following the Kornilov Affair, the Provisional Government lost further ground, and the Bolsheviks took advantage of the chaos to plan their next move.  

Before the affair, there had been internal debates within the Bolshevik Party about whether the time was right to seize power.

However, after Kornilov’s failed coup, Lenin became more convinced that the moment had arrived.

He argued that the Provisional Government was fatally weakened and that any delay in action would give their enemies time to regroup.

By October 1917, the Bolsheviks had positioned themselves as the dominant force in Petrograd.

They controlled key elements of the city’s defense and had the support of a growing number of disillusioned workers and soldiers.

Kornilov’s failed attempt to seize power had, in many ways, ensured Lenin’s own success.

When the Bolsheviks finally launched the October Revolution, there was little resistance from the demoralized government.  

After his arrest on September 1, 1917, General Lavr Kornilov was taken into custody and imprisoned in the Bykhov Monastery.

He was labeled a traitor, but his influence among the military and right-wing factions remained.

While imprisoned, he maintained contact with his supporters, who still viewed him as a symbol of resistance against Bolshevik influence.

Kornilov’s imprisonment, however, did not last long. In November 1917, following the Bolshevik seizure of power in the October Revolution, Kornilov managed to escape from his confinement along with several of his fellow officers.

Once free, he immediately sought to continue his fight against the Bolsheviks.

Kornilov’s escape was part of a broader reaction among military officers who refused to accept Bolshevik rule and sought to organize counter-revolutionary efforts.

After his escape, Kornilov joined the White movement, becoming one of the leading figures in the Russian Civil War.

He would go on to play a key role in organizing the anti-Bolshevik Volunteer Army, which fought against the Red Army in southern Russia.

By early 1918, he was actively leading the Volunteer Army in battle. However, his campaign against the Bolsheviks was short-lived.

In April 1918, Kornilov was killed during the fighting near Ekaterinodar (now Krasnodar) when an artillery shell struck his headquarters.