The Suez Crisis: Nasser's gamble and a failed top-secret Cold War agreement

The Suez Canal, which had finally been completed in 1869, quickly became one of the world's most crucial waterways, as it facilitated faster trade routes between Europe and Asia.

Its strategic importance was recognized by major powers, leading the British to secure a controlling interest in the canal in the late 19th century.

By the mid-20th century, as the winds of decolonization swept across Asia and Africa, the Middle East became a focal point of geopolitical interest, with the canal at its center.

Egypt had gained its independence from Britain in 1922, but was still under significant British influence, especially concerning the canal.

The situation began to change dramatically in the 1950s. In 1952, a coup led by the Free Officers Movement ousted King Farouk of Egypt, leading to the rise of Gamal Abdel Nasser.

Then, in 1954, Britain and Egypt signed the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement, under which Britain agree to withdraw its military forces from the Suez Canal Zone within two years.

This was a significant step toward Egyptian sovereignty over the strategic waterway.

The years leading up to the Suez Crisis were filled with a series of events that heightened tensions in the Middle East and set the stage for the impending conflict.

Gamal Abdel Nasser's rise to power in Egypt was accompanied by a vision of Arab nationalism and a desire to diminish Western influence in the region.

His policies and decisions increasingly alarmed the former colonial powers, especially Britain and France, and the strategic ally in the region, Israel.

One of the first signs of escalating tensions was the 1955 Baghdad Pact, an alliance between Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom.

This pact aimed to counter Soviet influence in the Middle East, but Nasser viewed it as a direct challenge to his vision of Arab unity.

In response, later that year, Nasser secured an arms deal with Czechoslovakia, a Soviet satellite state.

This move was seen by the West as Egypt leaning towards the Soviet bloc, further straining relations.

The situation became even more volatile in 1956. The United States and Britain had initially promised funding for the construction of the Aswan High Dam on the Nile, a project that Nasser believed would elevate Egypt's status in the region and boost its economy.

However, citing concerns over Egypt's growing ties with communist countries and Nasser's neutral stance in the Cold War, both nations withdrew their financial support in July 1956.

This decision was a significant blow to Nasser and Egypt's national pride.

Feeling cornered and seeking alternative means to fund the dam, Nasser made a bold move.

On July 26, 1956, he announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal. This decision meant that the revenues generated from the canal's operations would go directly to the Egyptian government.

While this was a popular move domestically, it was met with outrage by the canal's major stakeholders, Britain and France. 

The military intervention in the Suez Crisis was a complex operation involving three nations: Britain, France, and Israel, each with its own motivations.

The plan was orchestrated in secret, with the parties meeting in Sevres, France, on October 24, 1956, to finalize their strategy.

The three nations decided to work together on a coordinated invasion of Egypt, called the Sèvres Protocol, that would be triggered by an initial invasion by Israel.

Britain and France would then pretend to send in their own troops as 'peacekeepers' to respond to Israel's attack.

So, as arranged, on October 29, 1956, Israel began the conflict by invading the Sinai Peninsula and rapidly advancing towards the Suez Canal.

Israel publicly stated that they objective was to neutralize fedayeen attacks and Egyptian military threats.

However, it was really aimed at providing Britain and France the pretext they needed to intervene.

Following the Israeli advance, Britain and France issued an ultimatum to both Egypt and Israel on October 30, demanding a ceasefire and withdrawal of all troops to a distance of 10 miles from the Suez Canal.

The ultimatum was designed to provide a pretext for British and French intervention, as they anticipated Egypt's refusal.

As expected, Egypt rejected the ultimatum, and on October 31, Britain and France began their aerial bombardment of Egyptian positions.

Over the next few days, a series of air raids targeted key Egyptian infrastructure, including airfields, communication lines, and military installations.

On November 5, British and French paratroopers landed at key points along the canal, including Port Said.

The following day, seaborne troops joined the invasion, and together they began to take control of the northern part of the canal.

However, the military intervention was not as swift or as decisive as the tripartite powers had hoped.

Egyptian resistance, both military and civilian, was fierce. The Egyptians employed a scorched earth policy, destroying bridges and infrastructure to hinder the advance and even sinking ships to block the canal.

The international response to the Suez Crisis was swift and overwhelmingly critical of the tripartite intervention by Britain, France, and Israel.

The military action was seen by many as a blatant attempt by colonial powers to reassert their dominance in a post-colonial world.

This perception was further exacerbated by the secretive nature of the planning and the pretext under which the intervention was carried out.

The United States, under President Dwight D. Eisenhower, was particularly vocal in its opposition.

While the US had its own reservations about Nasser and his policies, it was deeply concerned about the broader implications of the crisis.

The Eisenhower administration feared that the intervention would push Arab nations closer to the Soviet Union and intensify Cold War tensions.

Moreover, the US was keen on projecting an image of supporting decolonization and self-determination, and the actions of Britain and France contradicted this narrative.

Therefore, the United States leveraged its economic power and threatened to sell off its holdings of the British pound.

As a result, the US applied significant economic and diplomatic pressure, including threats to withhold financial aid to Britain, to force a resolution.

The Soviet Union, embroiled in its own crisis in Hungary, was equally critical of the intervention.

While the Soviets were keen to exploit the situation to gain influence in the Middle East, they were also genuinely concerned about a potential escalation that could draw them into a direct conflict with the West.

Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev issued strong warnings, even thinly veiled nuclear threats, to the tripartite powers and even hinted at the possibility of intervention on Egypt's behalf.

The United Nations played a central role in managing the crisis. The General Assembly convened an emergency special session, during which there was widespread condemnation of the invasion.

This led to the establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), the first peacekeeping force of its kind.

This force initially consisted of over 6,000 peacekeeping troops from various nations, which meant that it was the first large-scale UN peacekeeping mission up to that time.

Many nations, both in the West and across the newly independent states of Asia and Africa, voiced their opposition to the intervention.

Protests erupted in various cities around the world, from London to New York, highlighting the global sentiment against the actions of Britain, France, and Israel.

By late November 1956, under the weight of diplomatic and economic pressures, Britain and France agreed to a ceasefire.

The United Nations played a pivotal role in ensuring the cessation of hostilities and the subsequent withdrawal of foreign troops.

The UNEF was deployed to Egypt to supervise the end of hostilities and facilitate the departure of British, French, and Israeli forces.

By March 1957, all foreign troops had left Egyptian soil. The UNEF remained in the Sinai Peninsula as a buffer between Egyptian and Israeli forces until 1967, playing a crucial role in maintaining peace in the region during that period.

The Suez Crisis resulted in over 1,000 Egyptian military and civilian casualties, while Britain and France suffered fewer than 200 combined casualties.

In the immediate aftermath, the Suez Crisis had profound implications for the parties directly involved.

For Britain and France, the crisis marked a significant decline in their global influence.

Their inability to achieve their objectives without American support, coupled with the widespread condemnation they faced, highlighted the end of an era where European powers could unilaterally dictate terms in international affairs.

In fact, British Prime Minister Anthony Eden's political standing declined rapidly, which led to his resignation in January 1957 amid widespread criticism of his handling of the crisis.

Israel, while achieving some tactical military successes, found itself diplomatically isolated.

The crisis did, however, highlight the security concerns Israel faced from its neighbors, setting the stage for future conflicts in the region.

For Egypt and Nasser, the aftermath of the crisis was a mixture of triumph and challenge.

Nasser emerged as a hero across the Arab world, having stood up to colonial powers and retained control of the Suez Canal.

However, the canal itself remained closed until April 1957 due to the damage and blockages caused during the conflict.

An international salvage operation involving teams from the United States, Britain, and other nations worked to clear the Suez Canal.

Its reopening was symbolic of Egypt's resilience and the restoration of its sovereignty.