The Cuban Missile Crisis: how close did we come to nuclear war?

On 14 October 1962, during a U-2 reconnaissance flight over Cuba, American pilots captured a series of high-altitude photographs that revealed the construction of Soviet missile installations.

The mission was flown by Major Richard Heyser. Once they had been developed and analysed by CIA experts who were led by Arthur Lundahl, the images confirmed the presence of R-12 Dvina medium-range ballistic missile sites, which NATO called the SS-4 Sandal.

Some of these appeared capable of launching warheads deep into the continental United States within minutes.

President John F. Kennedy received the intelligence the next morning. He immediately summoned his senior national security advisers to assess how serious the situation was and to prepare a response. 

Khrushchev had authorised the secret deployment of nuclear missiles to Cuba several months earlier in an attempt to address the nuclear gap between Soviet and American forces.

The United States had already stationed Jupiter missiles in Turkey and Italy, both of which could reach deep into the Soviet Union.

In Turkey alone, about 15 Jupiter missiles were stationed near Izmir and had been operational since 1961, each with a range of approximately 2,400 kilometres.

Italy hosted about 30 additional missiles. As a result, Khrushchev aimed to place American cities within range of Soviet weapons.

He also wanted to protect Fidel Castro's government from another US-backed invasion, such as the Bay of Pigs in 1961. 

Kennedy convened a group of senior officials known as the Executive Committee of the National Security Council, or ExComm, who met in secret to consider a range of military and diplomatic options.

Several of the Joint Chiefs of Staff urged immediate airstrikes to destroy the missile sites before they became operational.

Others warned that an attack might lead to a full Soviet retaliation. After days of tense discussion, Kennedy decided to pursue a naval quarantine of Cuba, which he announced in a televised address to the nation on 22 October.

The quarantine line was initially established about 800 nautical miles from the island, though it was later reduced to about 500 nautical miles as Soviet vessels approached.

He warned that any nuclear missile launched from Cuba would be treated as an attack by the Soviet Union and would require a full retaliatory response. 

Soviet officials denied the presence of offensive weapons in Cuba, although aerial surveillance continued to confirm the progress of the installations.

Khrushchev responded publicly with defiance and privately with anxiety. He issued instructions to Soviet ships that had already been en route to Cuba to continue their course, and he opened diplomatic channels behind the scenes.

American naval vessels, which included the USS Joseph P. Kennedy Jr., began to enforce the quarantine, and they intercepted and inspected Soviet cargo ships.

The patrols placed both navies on a collision course just off the Cuban coast. 

Soon after Kennedy’s public warning, Khrushchev sent two letters to Washington in rapid succession.

The first, which arrived on 26 October, adopted a softer tone and reportedly offered to remove the missiles in exchange for a public American pledge never to invade Cuba.

The second, delivered the following day, reportedly made tougher demands and added a further demand that the United States dismantle its Jupiter missiles in Turkey.

The sudden shift in tone caused confusion within ExComm and suggested disagreements inside the Soviet leadership or pressure from hardliners such as Marshal Rodion Malinovsky.

Ultimately, the United States publicly responded only to the first letter, while privately engaging on the second demand. 

Meanwhile, reconnaissance flights over Cuba increased. On 27 October, a Soviet SA-2 Guideline surface-to-air missile battery in Cuba fired on a U-2 reconnaissance plane, and the attack killed Major Rudolf Anderson.

The incident shocked American officials, as it marked the first death of the crisis and threatened to trigger the kind of military response that Kennedy had been trying to avoid.

Anderson would later become the first recipient of the Air Force Cross, awarded after his death.

Military leaders, who argued that American credibility depended on a strong show of force, urged the president to approve immediate airstrikes.

However, Kennedy resisted those demands and instead ordered a pause in military action.

He believed that diplomacy still offered a way to end the confrontation. 

That evening, Attorney General Robert Kennedy met with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin in a private meeting where he delivered a two-part offer.

The United States would publicly guarantee that it would not invade Cuba.

Privately, it agreed to remove its Jupiter missiles from Turkey within a few months.

Those missiles, which had already been scheduled for decommissioning, would be withdrawn quietly to avoid damaging NATO unity.

The arrangement remained a secret at the time and was denied publicly. Khrushchev, aware of the clear American military advantage and the risks of continued escalation, accepted the arrangement. 

At several moments, the chance of nuclear war became much more immediate than leaders publicly acknowledged.

American military officials did not realise that the Soviet Union had already deployed approximately 42,000 troops to Cuba and had equipped them with tactical nuclear weapons that commanders could use against an invading American force under certain pre-authorised orders.

These included FKR-1 cruise missiles and Luna short-range rockets capable of delivering nuclear payloads.

If Kennedy had approved the invasion recommended by his generals, those weapons might have been launched, prompting an automatic escalation to strategic nuclear exchange. 

During the height of the crisis, the United States briefly raised its military readiness level to DEFCON 2, the highest alert short of nuclear war.

Strategic bombers, which were armed with nuclear payloads, flew continuous airborne patrols, while submarines that carried nuclear missiles moved silently under the oceans.

American destroyers hunted Soviet vessels around Cuba. On the same day that the U-2 was shot down over Cuba, another U-2 piloted by Captain Charles Maultsby flew into Soviet airspace over Chukotka by mistake.

The pilot had become disoriented during a solar storm. In response, Soviet fighters scrambled, and American interceptors carrying nuclear-tipped missiles launched to protect the pilot.

Any mistake during those encounters could have started a chain of deadly events. 

For example, some records released decades later showed that American officials underestimated the scale of Soviet preparations on the island.

Soviet field commanders did not have full authority to launch, but they had orders that required them to use tactical nuclear weapons if communications with Moscow failed during an American invasion.

Had fighting broken out, the use of such weapons would have required a full American nuclear response.

That response would have destroyed Cuba and large parts of the Soviet Union.

The danger came from the weapons and from miscalculation, miscommunication, or an unauthorised act by a junior officer. 

If the crisis had escalated to nuclear war, the destruction would have been sudden and permanent.

An American invasion met by Soviet tactical nuclear weapons would have killed tens of thousands of troops in the opening hours and the United States would have had to respond with large strategic bombing.

Targets would have included Soviet missile sites, military bases, transport hubs, and urban centres, including Moscow, Leningrad, and Kiev.

Civilian casualties in the USSR would have numbered in the millions, and fallout would have spread across Eurasia. 

American cities, despite superior early warning systems and greater missile reliability, would also have faced massive losses.

The Soviet Union had deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched missiles that could have reached cities on the East and West Coasts.

Washington, D.C., New York, Boston, Chicago, San Francisco, and Los Angeles appeared on Soviet targeting maps.

Some RAND Corporation simulations suggested that initial nuclear exchanges could have caused up to 100 million deaths worldwide, depending on the scale and targets.

If even a fraction of those weapons reached their intended targets, the United States would have experienced devastation on a scale never before imagined. 

Cuba, meanwhile, would have become a radioactive ruin. American war planners had identified every military and industrial facility on the island for destruction, and civilian centres near missile installations would have been destroyed.

NATO allies would have become targets for Soviet missiles in Eastern Europe because of treaty obligations.

The global economy would have collapsed, and nuclear fallout would have poisoned food and water supplies across multiple continents.

In the aftermath, no country would have remained untouched by the destruction. 

The Cuban Missile Crisis forced leaders to face that traditional ideas about deterrence and escalation could not stop global destruction.

Both Kennedy and Khrushchev left the crisis determined to avoid such a close call again.

In August 1963, they signed the Limited Test Ban Treaty, which prohibited nuclear tests in the atmosphere, underwater, and in space.

However, key nuclear powers such as France and China refused to sign, and underground testing continued. 

Since then, nuclear powers have built frameworks for arms control and disarmament and they have established direct lines for rapid communication, but the weapons themselves have not disappeared.

In recent years, new rivalries and expanding arsenals created new risks, cyber threats added another risk, and mistrust between nations stayed the same.

Regional powers have developed nuclear capabilities, and existing arsenals have become more mobile and harder to track. 

The Cuban Missile Crisis is the clearest example of how nuclear war can result from secrecy and brinkmanship combined with failed communication.

Every surviving account shows that reason and patience prevented disaster, and they made communication clearer.

In a world where nuclear weapons still exist, and where great powers continue to clash, the lessons of 1962 should be central to decisions made today.

Misjudgement still has the power to destroy everything.