Chevauchée: The brutal war tactic knights used to terrorize the people of medieval Europe

From the early twelfth century, as feudal warfare became increasingly structured around cavalry and localised authority, chevauchées began to appear in military campaigns across France and Iberia.

Norman lords in southern Italy and crusading forces in the Holy Land also employed comparable forms of destruction, but the term “chevauchée” itself became firmly attached to French soil.

During the thirteenth century, it grew more prominent in the internal conflicts of France, such as the Albigensian Crusade, where mounted raids were used to subdue rebellious provinces and punish noncompliant lords.

However, these early uses remained sporadic, often tied to regional disputes or dynastic squabbles. 

By the fourteenth century, chevauchées took on a more systematic role within Anglo-French warfare.

During the Hundred Years’ War, which began in 1337, English kings such as Edward III adopted the tactic as a central part of their military strategy.

French territory became the main target of these devastating expeditions.

Between 1339 and the late 1370s, repeated chevauchées swept through Gascony, Normandy, Picardy, and Île-de-France.

Their timing was often deliberate, coinciding with harvests or religious festivals.

They planned the raids during harvests or religious festivals so they could disrupt the economy and humiliate local leaders.

In this period, the chevauchée reached its most notorious form. 

The chevauchée avoided prolonged engagements because it relied on speed and surprise.

Commanders preferred to move quickly across enemy lands, with light cavalry that could travel over long distances quickly.

A typical expedition lasted several weeks and covered hundreds of kilometres.

Knights and mounted men-at-arms struck isolated villages, manors, abbeys, and undefended towns.

Their goal was destruction rather than occupation. Any strongholds that resisted were bypassed unless a swift assault seemed feasible.

The tactic aimed to make protection by local lords appear ineffective, thereby eroding trust in their ability to defend their people. 

Within the broader context of medieval warfare, the chevauchée also had a political purpose.

It disrupted tax collection, halted trade, and forced local populations to flee or starve.

The damage weakened royal authority and placed pressure on monarchs to negotiate peace or surrender territory.

It was particularly effective in France due to the fragmented nature of French feudal obligations.

If vassals failed to protect their lands, their loyalty to the crown could falter.

English leaders exploited this vulnerability by targeting weakly held regions. They targeted weakly held regions in order to force a political or military breakdown without committing to a full invasion. 

Among the most notorious examples was Edward III’s chevauchée of 1346. His army departed from Normandy and marched through northern France.

They looted towns and destroyed the countryside before they ultimately reached Crécy.

This campaign set the stage for the famous English victory at the Battle of Crécy, but the chevauchée itself caused far greater suffering among civilians.

The English intentionally destroyed granaries, vineyards, mills, and bridges. They knew that weakening the food supply and transport links would have longer-term effects than any battlefield clash.

In the following years, French record-keepers noted villages abandoned and whole provinces impoverished. 

Another brutal campaign occurred in 1355 when Edward the Black Prince, eldest son of Edward III, led a chevauchée from Bordeaux into Languedoc.

His forces devastated the region and attacked cities such as Carcassonne and Narbonne.

Although they refrained from storming the well-defended cities themselves, they burned surrounding settlements and farmland.

The damage was so severe that local French commanders were unable to regain control for months.

In 1356, the Black Prince launched a second chevauchée through central France, and this expedition ended at the Battle of Poitiers.

That expedition inflicted significant territorial damage and captured the French king, Jean II, which threw the French monarchy into disarray. 

For ordinary people, the chevauchée inflicted deadly attacks on civilian communities, forcibly removed families from their homes, and left many on the brink of hunger.

Villages were frequently torched in the night, and survivors either fled to forests or found refuge in nearby castles, if those castles had room.

The loss of stored grain and livestock meant famine could follow even months after the raiders departed.

Without the resources to recover, many peasants abandoned their homes permanently.

Contemporary letters and chronicles from both England and France describe fields left untilled and entire parishes empty.

Disease followed the malnutrition, with outbreaks of dysentery and plague worsened by poor sanitation and crowded living conditions in walled towns. 

Aside from the physical damage, the chevauchée spread fear widely. It undermined the sense of order in feudal society.

Lords who failed to defend their tenants saw their power weaken. Monasteries and churches were not spared, and looting of relics or religious vessels contributed to a growing sense that war had become lawless.

Even when populations tried to pay ransoms or bribes to avoid destruction, there was no guarantee of safety.

The random violence of the chevauchée made it difficult for civilians to trust any promises of protection, whether from their own rulers or foreign invaders. 

As the fifteenth century progressed, the tactical advantages of the chevauchée began to decline.

France’s royal administration became more centralised under Charles VII and later Louis XI.

The development of standing armies and improved regional defences meant that rapid mounted raids could be stopped more effectively.

Garrisoned towns and fortified roads reduced the freedom of movement once enjoyed by raiding forces.

In addition, local militias grew more capable of resisting small detachments of knights.

By the 1440s, the French response to English raids had become swift and retaliatory, which made further chevauchées far riskier. 

The changing nature of warfare also made the chevauchée less relevant. The rise of artillery, professional infantry, and siege warfare shifted the focus of military campaigns toward key fortresses and prolonged operations.

Negotiations and trade measures replaced terror as the main tools of influence.

The Treaty of Picquigny in 1475 marked the final retreat of English aims in France, and with it, the end of the chevauchée as a regular strategy.

By that point, the damage it had inflicted on people’s lives, local economies, and moral influence had left lasting damage across the medieval world.

Its disappearance showed the growing cost and diminishing effectiveness of destruction for its own sake rather than moral restraint.