The Schlieffen Plan: Strategic genius or fundamentally flawed design?

The concept of the Schlieffen Plan originated in the strategic tensions of late 19th and early 20th century Europe.

Alfred von Schlieffen, who served as the Chief of the German General Staff from 1891 to 1906, crafted the plan in response to Germany's precarious geopolitical position.

Flanked by potentially hostile powers - France to the west and Russia to the east - Germany faced the daunting prospect of a two-front war.

That kind of scenario could have stretched its military resources too thin and lead to an easy defeat.

However, Schlieffen had a keen understanding of strategy and sought to address this predicament by developing a two-part plan.

The final version of the Schlieffen Plan was completed in 1905. It specifically outlined a sweeping army movement through Belgium and into northern France, bypassing the heavily fortified Franco-German border.

This involved a massive deployment of about 90% of Germany's available troops to the western front, creating a wide arc of advance from the Netherlands down into France, aiming to encircle Paris and trap the majority of the French army against the Swiss border.

Contrary to the traditional military strategy of achieving a balance of forces across the whole front, the Schlieffen Plan placed emphasis on the strength of the "outer wing" to achieve a decisive victory.

The idea was to make the right wing of the German army so strong that it could advance like a door swinging on a hinge, with the left-wing playing the role of the defensive "hinge" along the border with France and Switzerland.

After capturing Paris and compelling France to surrender, the German forces were to be quickly transported eastward by rail to counter the Russian advance, which, as per Schlieffen's calculations, would be slow due to Russia's less developed infrastructure and complex mobilization process.

One key assumption was that Russia, given its large size and less developed infrastructure, would take longer to mobilize its troops compared to other European powers.

However, this presupposition was risky as it was essentially a bet against time, a gamble that Russia would remain slow and inefficient.

The plan also assumed a swift and decisive victory over France, akin to the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71.

In practical terms, Germany aimed to encircle and destroy the main French armies in just six weeks: a timeline that left little room for delay or error.

Also, this assumption about France's military capabilities overlooked the fact that the French army had significantly strengthened and reformed since their defeat in the Franco-Prussian War.

Another key assumption was the anticipated neutrality from Belgium when German troops moved through its territory.

This, too, was a significant gamble. Violating Belgian neutrality would risk bringing other countries, particularly Britain, into the war against Germany.

Schlieffen, however, calculated that the strategic advantage of a swift march through Belgium would outweigh the potential diplomatic fallout.

However, despite the clear indication that Britain would defend Belgium's neutrality, as guaranteed by the 1839 Treaty of London, the plan proceeded under the belief that Britain either wouldn't intervene or would be too slow to mount a meaningful opposition.

The execution of the Schlieffen Plan finally occurred in August 1914, following the outbreak of the conflict.

Importantly, by this time, Schlieffen had passed away, and the responsibility of implementing the plan fell to his successor, Helmuth von Moltke the Younger.

Moltke, while expressing doubts about the feasibility of the plan, went ahead with its execution.

He did make several modifications that significantly deviated from Schlieffen's original concept.

The German Army, as per the plan, swept through Belgium in early August 1914.

Immediately, things did not go as planned. Contrary to Germany's pre-war expectations, Belgium put up fierce resistance.

Additionally, the violation of Belgium's neutrality led to Britain declaring war on Germany, thus expanding the scope of the conflict.

This started to slow down the German advance.

The delay gave the French and the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) time to mobilize their forces.

Simultaneously, on the Eastern Front, Russia had managed to mobilize its troops much faster than Germany had anticipated.

They even launched a significant invasion into East Prussia.

In response, Moltke diverted much needed forces from the critical right wing in the west to bolster the eastern defenses.

Back in France, the advancing German armies made substantial progress initially, pushing back the French and the BEF.

However, the reduced strength of the right wing, due to the diversion of troops to the east, diminished the sweeping power of the planned encircling movement.

The German advance eventually reached the outskirts of Paris but was halted at the Battle of the Marne in early September 1914.

At this point, the Allies were finally able to launch a successful counter-offensive.

Following an incredible victory known as the 'Miracle of the Marne', the invaders were driven back towards Belgium.

The Schlieffen Plan had failed.

The failure of the Schlieffen Plan had far-reaching consequences that significantly shaped the course of the rest of the war.

The immediate consequence was the onset of a gruelling stalemate on the Western Front.

The trench warfare that developed from this became the main defining feature of the next four years.

As a result, the Western Front remained largely static for the next four years.

The failure of the plan exposed the Germany's vulnerability in a two-front war, the very scenario it sought to avoid.

Germany's military resources were immediately strained, and it led to eventual defeat.

Critics of the plan often point to its foundational assumptions as a fundamental flaw.

However, another significant critique lies in the plan's inflexibility. The Schlieffen Plan was a precise and prescriptive strategy, leaving little room for adaptation or modification in response to changing circumstances on the battlefield.